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Abstract 
A substantial amount of research, as well as media hype, has surrounded RFID 
technology and its privacy implications.  Currently, researchers and the media focus 
on the privacy threats posed by RFID, while consumer groups choose to boycott 
products bearing RFID tags.  At the same, however, a very similar technology has 
quietly become part of our everyday lives: Bluetooth. In this paper we highlight the 
fact that Bluetooth is a widespread technology that has real privacy implications.  
Furthermore, we explore the applicability of RFID-based solutions to address these 
privacy implications. 
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 Introduction 
A substantial amount of research, as well as media hype, has surrounded RFID 
technology and its privacy implications [1,2].  Currently, researchers and media focus 
on the privacy threats posed by RFID, while consumer groups choose to boycott 
products bearing RFID tags.  At the same time a very similar technology has quietly 
become part of our everyday lives: Bluetooth.  In a recent study we found that at least 
7.5% of observed pedestrians had Bluetooth-enabled mobile devices [3].  Although 
intended for different uses and purposes, both Bluetooth and RFID allow for mobility 
and unique identification. It is this characteristic that makes these two technologies 
similar in terms of the privacy threats they pose. 
In this paper we first describe the technical similarities and differences between RFID 
and Bluetooth.  Based on these, we highlight a number of RFID-related privacy 
threats that equally apply to Bluetooth.  We then consider the suitability of RFID-
based solutions to these threats, and examine how well they transfer to Bluetooth.  We 
conclude with a real-world case study where Bluetooth was used to identify devices 
(and presumably their owners) at the scene of a crime. 
Our intention is two-fold.  First, we wish to highlight the fact that Bluetooth is a 
widespread technology that has real privacy implications.  Second, we want to 
explore the applicability of RFID-based solutions to address these implications.  We 
conclude that although RFID can potentially pose more significant privacy threats, at 
the moment Bluetooth poses much more considerable threats to privacy. 
RFID vs. Bluetooth 
Both RFID and Bluetooth are wireless communication technologies.  RFID operates 
at the 13.56 MHz frequency, and RFID tags have a range of typically up to 30 cm, 
while self-powered active RFID tags have a range of up to 100m.  Bluetooth operates 
at the 2.45 GHz frequency, with ranges of up to 100 m.  While RFID operations 
typically involve a tag and a reader, Bluetooth communication takes place between 
Bluetooth-enabled devices. Both technologies, however, rely on unique identifiers for 
operation.   
Identification 
Every RFID tag provides a unique identifier (128 bits in newer tags), and additional 
information up to a few kilobytes may be stored in the tag itself.  This identifier is 
used either as a key (for example to look up the price of a product), or as a mechanism 
to distinguish between multiple tags.  RFID tags can also store information such as 
the electronic product code assigned to the object, the location or other asset on which 
the tag is attached, as well as application-related user data.  
Bluetooth devices have a 48-bit unique identifier and 24-bit device class descriptor. 
Additionally, each device can be assigned a “user-friendly” device name (up to 256 
characters).  Each Bluetooth device provides a number of services, such as file-
transfer, serial port, or audio link.  These services can be utilised by other nearby 
Bluetooth-enabled devices.  Once a link has been established between two devices, 
any amount of data can be exchanged. 
Communication 
Both RFID and Bluetooth operate in a broadcast model for communication.  For 
RFID, a scanner will typically transmit a request signal and wait for a response from 
all the tags within range.  At this point the reader can choose a specific device and 
query it directly.  A very similar process takes place with Bluetooth: an inquiring 
device hops through a set of prescribed frequencies and transmits a request signal, and 
any device within range responds to this request.  Given the set of responses, the 
inquiring Bluetooth device can choose to communicate with any specific device 
within range.  
We should highlight an important difference between the two technologies. In RFID 
there is a clear distinction between tags and readers: tags are “dumb” units with 
limited functionality whose sole purpose is to be associated with an item in the real 
world, while readers are smart units whose purpose is to seek RFID tags and query 
them or modify them.  The picture is completely different when we focus on 
Bluetooth devices.  With Bluetooth there is no distinction between tags and readers, 
as effectively each device can act as both.  Furthermore, both parties are equals in 
communication, as each device can access the other device’s services.  This 
fundamental difference between RFID and Bluetooth is a first hint towards the 
privacy threats posed by Bluetooth. 
While end-users are expected to carry RFID tags embedded in everyday objects, there 
is no intention to equip end-users with RFID scanners, just as users never required 
barcode readers.  Even if users were to be equipped with mobile RFID readers, their 
scanning potential would be limited due to RFID’s limited range.  On the other hand, 
users who own Bluetooth-enabled device effectively own a Bluetooth scanner.    
By default, therefore, Bluetooth empowers users to carry out their own scanning of 
nearby devices. On the other hand, certain knowledge of electronics is required to 
build an RFID scanner, while off-the-shelf RFID scanners are too narrow in 
functionality for any end-user to be interested at the moment. 
Privacy threats 
The media hype surrounding RFID threats relate to the fact that every single item can 
potentially be tagged with passive tags – from clothes and shoes to food and 
medicine.  On the other hand, Bluetooth is typically found in communication devices, 
as it requires a source of power.  In a recent study we found that approximately 7.5% 
of pedestrians had a Bluetooth-enabled device [3].  This study was carried out in the 
city of Bath, UK, and we expect this figure to be different in other cities and 
countries.  
Realistically, however, Bluetooth is out there on the streets today.  Most newer 
phones, PDAs and satellite navigators provide Bluetooth functionality.  Therefore, it 
is worth considering the threats that Bluetooth poses today.  Here we draw on a 
summary of RFID privacy threats described in [1].  After describing each RFID 
threat, we discuss its applicability to Bluetooth. 
Association threat  
This threat illustrates the fact that a user’s identity can be associated with certain 
items.  For example, when buying RFID-tagged goods with a credit card, the seller 
can link those goods to the credit card, and ultimately, the identity of the buyer.   
The exact same threat is posed by Bluetooth technology.  Sellers of Bluetooth devices 
(for example mobile phone operators) can link the Bluetooth unique identifier to the 
identity of the owner.  This can happen at the point of sale.  Although at the moment 
there is no centralised database containing such information, there exists a very 
similar database linking mobile phone unique identifiers (i.e. IMEI) to individuals.  
This database could easily be extended to include Bluetooth identifiers. 
Location threat 
Given the ability to link a tag or item to a person, the person’s or item’s location can 
be revealed and tracked.  Using RFID this is possible by installing hidden readers at 
specific locations.  This allows for people, or devices, to be identified and tracked. 
The exact same threat applies to Bluetooth technology.  Any Bluetooth device can be 
used to identify and track nearby users, and can also be used to determine the location 
of Bluetooth-enabled artefacts like mobile phones, POS tills, PDAs and satellite 
navigators.  In addition to our own work (e.g. [3]), a number of other projects [4,5] 
are doing exactly this: tracking users through space using Bluetooth technology.  In 
fact, the first commercial products involving Bluetooth tracking are starting to appear 
on the market.1  As we describe in the association threat above, however, although a 
device can be traced in space and time, at the moment there is no way to link that 
device to an individual. 
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Preference threat  
In addition to revealing an item’s unique identity, RFID tags uniquely identify the 
manufacturer and product type of the tagged items.  This information can be captured 
and used to create a preference profile of an individual, and even be used to determine 
the monetary value of these products.  For instance, we could detect if a user likes to 
shop at a specific store, or even identify any specific medicine the user is carrying and 
thus infer a disease they may have.  Similarly, we can calculate the value of the items 
in a purse. 
The exact same threat applies to Bluetooth devices:  the provided information can be 
used to determine the type (or class) of a device (e.g. laptop, desktop, mobile phone) 
and the manufacturer of the product (e.g. Nokia, Sony-Ericsson, Apple).  
Additionally, advanced fingerprinting techniques can determine the exact model of a 
mobile phone.2   Such techniques also enable us to derive estimates of the monetary 
value of the scanned products. 
Constellation threat  
Users carrying dozens of RFID-tagged items can be seen to have a digital “shadow” 
or “constellation.”  A constellation can be used to track individuals without 
necessarily knowing their identity.   
This is also true of Bluetooth, but to a smaller extent.  Users typically carry a handful 
of Bluetooth-enabled devices, such as a mobile phone, PDA, headset, or satellite 
navigator.  These, however, still create a digital shadow that can be tracked and 
monitored.  Another version of this threat is to derive associations between people: a 
Bluetooth constellation might describe a group of people, and the behaviour of this 
constellation can allow us to infer properties of this group.  
Transaction threat  
Transactions between individuals can be tracked by observing changes in 
constellations.  When an RFID-tagged item moves from one constellation to another, 
we can determine that a transaction between those individuals took place.   
The exact same threat holds for items forming Bluetooth constellations, although to a 
smaller extent.  The limited scope for transaction threats in Bluetooth is due to the 
small number of devices that an individual may carry. 
Breadcrumb threat  
As a consequence of the association threat, a user can e constantly linked to RFID-
tagged items they purchased.  This association does not necessarily break when the 
user discards those items.  The breadcrumb threat arises when discarded items are 
used, for example, to commit a crime, in which case the original owner might be 
implicated.   
In terms of Bluetooth this is a perfectly plausible scenario, however it is limited by 
the fact that Bluetooth items are not necessarily discarded.  It is still possible, 
however, that a user discards, for example, a mobile phone, which in turn is used by a 
criminal at the scene of a crime.  
                                                
2 http://trifinite.org/trifinite_stuff_blueprinting.html 
Solutions 
The above threats, although initially conceived in relation to RFID technology, also 
apply to Bluetooth technology.   Actually, in most cases the threats are exaggerated 
when considering Bluetooth technology because of Bluetooth’s longer range and the 
ease and availability of Bluetooth scanning.  We now consider some of the solutions 
proposed in relation to RFID [2], and examine their applicability to Bluetooth.  
Discarding or destruction 
RFID tags can be completely discarded after they have served their purpose.  For 
example, it has been proposed that RFID tags are destroyed at the point of sale.  
Similarly, users can remove a tag from the products they buy, provided that these tags 
are ease to locate and remove. 
This solution, however, does not transfer to Bluetooth at all. The reason is that 
whereas RFID is mostly useful up to the point of sale, Bluetooth is really useful after 
the point of sale. Destroying the Bluetooth functionality of a mobile device would 
actually damage the device and limit its capabilities.  Most mobile devices rely on 
Bluetooth for establishing wireless links, exchanging files, and synchronising.   
Furthermore, while RFID tags may be visible and easily removed, Bluetooth is 
typically embedded in products, and thus cannot easily be destroyed without 
damaging the product itself. 
Deactivation or suppressing 
Elaborate security mechanisms have been proposed to temporarily deactivate or 
suppress RFID tags [2].  The complexity of this process in RFID is due to the fact that 
a tag cannot be deactivated directly, but instead a reader must send it a deactivation 
command.  This, in turn, raises concerns of unauthorised readers being able to 
deactivate tags. Therefore, security measures involving passwords are used to ensure 
that only authorised readers can deactivate a tag.   
Conceptually, Bluetooth also uses deactivation as a privacy measure.  In practice, 
however, the process is slightly different. Unlike RFID, users can directly interact 
with the Bluetooth functionality of their mobile device.  Users can either  
• completely switch off their device, 
• selectively disable Bluetooth on their device, or  
• configure their Bluetooth to operate in “stealth” mode, which effectively 
suppresses the unique identifier.   
The first two options do not allow for any Bluetooth communication to take place, 
while the third option allows for Bluetooth communication to take place with specific 
and known devices, also referred to as “paired” devices. 
There are two caveats, however, to these privacy measures.   First, our studies have 
shown that a considerable portion of the public (7.5%) does not deactivate or suppress 
their Bluetooth devices [3].  This is partly due to the culture, at least in the UK, of 
giving one’s device funny names, such that others can see them when they carry out 
Bluetooth scans.  Furthermore, it could simply be due to the lack of knowledge and 
understanding of how Bluetooth operates.  Secondly, once an individual’s identity has 
been linked to a Bluetooth device (association threat), it becomes trivial to scan for 
that specific individual even if their device operates in stealth mode.  This is possible 
because stealth mode assumes that other parties do not know a device’s unique 
identifier.  Given that unique identifier, however, stealth mode offers no privacy 
protection. 
Renaming 
Another approach to dealing with RFID privacy concerns is to periodically change the 
unique identifiers that a tag emits.  Thus, only readers with knowledge of the 
renaming sequence can keep track of the specific tags.  A way to achieve this is for 
tag and reader to, for example, share a predefined set of identifiers through which a 
tag cycles over its lifetime.   
This solution can potentially work with Bluetooth, although it becomes much more 
complicated since, with Bluetooth, renaming must take place on both communicating 
parties.  For this solution to work with Bluetooth, each device must keep track of the 
renaming cycle on every other device it talks to, and visa versa. This is further 
complicated by the fact that Bluetooth devices can operate in networks of up to 8 
devices, also known as piconets.  An elaborate mechanism is required to allow all 
communicating parties to be updated of the name changes that take place within the 
piconet. 
Exploiting physical properties 
Many of the RFID-related privacy issues can be addressed by making sure that the 
scanner attempting to read a tag is within a very close range.  Doing so avoids the 
issues caused by hidden or covert scanners.  This can be achieved by installing certain 
circuits within the tags that effectively limit the actual range of RFID.   
This approach is by definition not applicable to Bluetooth.  The range of Bluetooth is 
an extremely useful feature, and minimising its range would render Bluetooth useless.  
An approach that might be more practical would involve the installation of a knob, 
similar to the volume knobs found in walkmans, which would dynamically adjust the 
strength of the Bluetooth signal.3  This would allow users to extend their signal as 
much as is required.  However, anyone within that distance would still be able to 
instantiate all the threats we have presented. 
Non-RFID solutions 
The solutions we have presented so far originate in research on RFID privacy threats.  
Some of these solutions transfer to Bluetooth (i.e. deactivation, renaming, exploiting 
physical properties), while other solutions cannot be transferred to Bluetooth (i.e. 
discarding and destruction).  Here we present some further solutions that are only 
applicable to Bluetooth communications and we have developed with Bluetooth in 
mind.  
Our first suggested solution is the hit counter.  At the moment, the Bluetooth protocol 
allows a device to be notified when another device has inquired the list of services, 
but not when other devices “discovered” it.  However, a slight modification of the 
Bluetooth stack would allow each device to keep track of how many times it has been 
discovered, much like the hit counter on web pages.  This number can be displayed to 
users, who can thus be made more aware of Bluetooth activity.  Users can thus choose 
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to disable Bluetooth on their devices when there appears to be unknown and/or 
systematic Bluetooth activity. 
Another suggested solution is the guest book.  Building on the hit counter solution, a 
device can keep a record of the identifiers of the devices that have discovered it. The 
user would then be able to inspect the list of those devices, and identify traces of 
unauthorised activity.  
Our final solution to protecting privacy is an adaptation of the renaming solution.  We 
propose that Bluetooth can rely on the “user-friendly” name, as opposed to the unique 
identifiers.  This solution is quite similar to the idea of using self-assigned IP 
addresses for peer-to-peer WiFi communication.  Typically, Bluetooth operations take 
place between two devices, thus it can be relatively straightforward for the user or 
users to make sure that each device is given a unique name.  Additionally, each device 
could self-assign a name (or part of the name) periodically, or for each Bluetooth 
activity.  The drawback of this solution is that pairings between devices can only last 
until one of the two devices changes its name.  This also means frequent tasks (such 
as synchronisation of data using Bluetooth) would require an extra step of device 
discovery. 
Case study: Bluetooth CSI 
We illustrate the reality of Bluetooth privacy threats by describing a case study where 
we used Bluetooth to carry out our own, informal, crime scene investigation (CSI).  In 
the early morning of November 29, 2006, the police in Bath, UK, were informed of a 
teenager dying after having fallen from the top of a building in the city centre. Early 
reports mentioned a second individual who subsequently fled the scene of the 
incident.  The following day, the police appealed to the general public for anyone 
with any information to come forward. 
This incident took place at the building where one of our Bluetooth scanners is 
located.  This scanner, which is part of a network of scanners across the city of Bath, 
is used to record mobility traces of people, much like the work carried out by similar 
projects [4,5].  The night of the incident, our scanner was fully operational, and 
constantly recorded the presence of any Bluetooth device within its range. 
Shortly after we began our analysis of the data from the night of the incident, the 
police ended the enquiry.  The unlucky teenager and his friend were drunk, they 
decided to climb to the top of the building and in an unfortunate moment the teenager 
lost his balance and fell, landing on the sidewalk. 
In our limited analysis of the data we were able to identify a number of devices 
present at the scene of the incident shortly before and shortly after the teenager fell. 
Because there is no way to link a Bluetooth identifier to someone’s identity, our data 
cannot be used to directly implicate anyone.  Additionally, we can only be certain 
about the device being present at the location, not the person.  However, our data 
could be used to narrow down the search for potential eyewitnesses.  For example, the 
police could have achieved this by sweeping the streets and identifying people whose 
device identifier matched our records.4  
                                                
4 Although our data is stored using a one-way hash function, the same function can be 
applied in real time by the police to generate a match. 
In addition to identifying a set of devices that appeared at the scene of the incident, 
we were able to cross-reference our database and identify the appearance patterns of 
those people.  This subsequently gave us further information about each device.  For 
instance, one of the devices must belong to a taxi driver or delivery van, as it is a 
satellite navigation unit and in our database appears many times throughout the day or 
night at this location.  We should mention that there is a taxi rank nearby this location.  
A second device must belong to an individual such as a street sweeper or security 
guard, since in our database this device appears in a number of locations across the 
city centre, and always between 10pm and 3am.    
We have not been able to verify the findings of our data analysis.  Despite this, we 
feel that very useful information can be extracted from our dataset, as well as any 
proximity-based traces database.  Patterns of behaviour can help identify individuals, 
their occupation, as well as predict where they are going to be. 
Conclusion 
While RFID has captured the attention of both the research and consumer 
communities, Bluetooth has quietly become one of the most widely used technologies 
found on the streets today.  In this article we describe the remarkable similarities in 
the threats posed by RFID and Bluetooth.  Furthermore, while a number of 
mechanisms have been developed to curb those threats in relation to RFID, few of 
these mechanisms transfer well to Bluetooth.  In fact, Bluetooth’s increased range and 
ease of scanning greatly increases those threats.  We demonstrate the reality of the 
privacy threats posed by Bluetooth in a case study involving a lethal accident.  In 
table 1 we summarise the RFID threats we have discussed in this paper, and their 
applicability to Bluetooth.  Similarly, in Table 2 we summarise the proposed solutions 
and their applicability to Bluetooth. 
 
 
Threat RFID Bluetooth 
Association threat   (requires database) 
Location threat   
Preference threat   
Constellation threat   (applies to groups) 
Transaction threat   (limited) 
Breadcrumb threat  (limited) 
Table 1.  Privacy threats using RFID and Bluetooth. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Solution RFID Bluetooth 
Discard   
Destroy   
Deactivate/suppress   
Rename   (considerable adaptation) 
Exploit physical properties   
Hit counter   (protocol patch) 
Guest book   (protocol patch) 
User-friendly name only   (protocol adaptation) 
Table 2.  Privacy preserving strategies and their applicability to RFID and Bluetooth. 
 
 
 
Although the Bluetooth threats we have described are real, and the penetration of 
Bluetooth has reached a considerable portion of the public, very few cases have been 
documented where Bluetooth was used to instantiate any of the threats we have 
described here.  Perhaps one of the stories that gained some publicity was Paris 
Hilton’s famous hacking of her phone using Bluetooth.5  Ironically, however, this 
attack exploited weaknesses in the Bluetooth security model, and had nothing to do 
with the threats posed by the unique identifiers described here. 
Instead of causing havoc, Bluetooth’s “leakiness” has resulted in a culture of playful 
exploration and exchange of media, at least in the UK.  Typically bored teenagers, as 
well as adults, engage in various games using Bluetooth, ranging from the simple 
exchange of messages in night clubs to playing Bluetooth “hide and seek” on ships: 
taking a photograph of a location on the ship and transmitting it to the other person 
using Bluetooth.  Despite all the games, however, the threats persist. 
To conclude, we should mention that many popular communication technologies, 
such as WiFi and GPRS, also involve the use of unique identifiers. Unlike RFID’s 
truly pervasive potential, Bluetooth and other similar technologies are not intended to 
be used on almost every conceivable object.  Despite this, technologies such as 
Bluetooth are quite popular already; it is worth considering, therefore, the privacy 
threats they pose, and the mechanisms to address those threats.  
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